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Fans of the National Football League may well have 
observed the following behavior by the Houston Oilers 
during the 19— season. At home against Kansas City, 
when confronted with a fourth down in its own end of 
the field, Houston punted 100 percent of the time. The 
next week, at St. Louis, in the same situation, Houston 
punted 93 percent of the time. The following week at 
Oakland, again in that situation, Houston again punted 
100 percent of the time, as it did the subsequent week 
at home against San Diego, and so on and on for the 
rest of the season. In short, on the basis of the time 
series data, Houston has a tendency to punt on fourth 
downs in its own territory, no matter what team it plays 
or where. 
Having observed this historical record, suppose it is 
our task to predict how Houston will behave in the 
future on fourth and long in its own territory. For 
example, suppose that next week Houston is to play an 
expansion team at Portland that it has never played 
before. It seems safe to predict that Houston will punt 
on fourth downs in its own territory at Portland. This 
sensible prediction is not based on any understanding 
of the game of football, but rather on simply extrapolat-
ing a past behavior pattern into the future. 
In many cases, we would expect this method of 
prediction to work well. However, for precisely those 
cases in which predictions are most interesting, the 
extrapolative method can be expected to break down. 
For instance, suppose that the Commissioner of the 
*This paper is based on remarks prepared for the September 1980 Inter-
national Symposium of the Hosei University in Tokyo, Japan. 
National Football League announced a rule change, 
effective next Sunday, which gave a team six downs in 
which to make a first down. Would we still expect 
Houston to punt on fourth down? Clearly not; at least 
no one familiar with the game of football would. 
What this example indicates is that historical pat-
terns of human behavior often depend on the rules of 
the game in which people are participating. Since much 
human behavior is purposeful, it makes sense to expect 
that it will change to take advantage of changes in the 
rules. This principle is so familiar to fans of football 
and other sports that it hardly bears mentioning. How-
ever, the principle very much deserves mentioning in 
the context of economic policy because here it has 
been routinely ignored — and with some devastating 
results.
1 Adherents of the theory of rational expecta-
tions believe, in fact, that no less than the field of 
macroeconomics must be reconstructed in order to 
take account of this principle of human behavior. Their 
efforts to do that involve basic changes in the ways 
economists formulate, simulate, and predict with econ-
ometric models. They also call for substantial changes 
in the ways economic policymakers frame their op-
tions.
2 
Models must let behavior change 
with the rules of the game 
In order to provide quantitative advice about the 
Charles Whiteman and Ian Bain are responsible for impressing upon me 
the many parallels between football and macroeconomics. 
2This is the message of Lucas 1976. 
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effects of alternative economic policies, economists 
have constructed collections of equations known as 
econometric models.
3 For the most part, these models 
consist of equations that attempt to describe the behav-
ior of economic agents — firms, consumers, and gov-
ernments— in terms of variables which are assumed to 
be closely related to their situations. Such equations 
are often called decision rules since they describe the 
decisions people make about things like consumption 
rates, investment rates, and portfolios as functions of 
variables that summarize the information people use to 
make those decisions. For all of their mathematical 
sophistication, econometric models amount to statisti-
cal devices for organizing and detecting patterns in the 
past behavior of people's decision making, patterns 
which can then be used as a basis for predicting their 
future behavior. 
As devices for extrapolating future behavior from 
the past under a given set of rules of the game, or 
government policies, these models appear to have 
performed well.
4 They have not, however, when the 
rules have changed. In formulating advice for policy-
makers, economists have routinely used these models 
to predict the consequences of historically unprece-
dented, hypothetical government interventions that can 
only be described as changes in the rules of the game. 
In effect, the models have been manipulated in a way 
which amounts to assuming that people's patterns of 
behavior do not depend on those properties of the 
environment that government interventions would 
change. The assumption has been, that is, that people 
will act under the new rules just as they have under the 
old, so that even under new rules past behavior is still a 
reliable guide to future behavior. Econometric models 
used in this way have not been able to accurately 
predict the consequences of historically unparalleled 
interventions.
5 To take one painful recent example, 
standard Keynesian and monetarist econometric mod-
els built in the late 1960s failed to predict the effects on 
output, employment, and prices that were associated 
with the unprecedented large deficits and rates of 
money creation of the 1970s. 
Recent research has been directed at building econ-
ometric models that take into account that people's be-
havior patterns will vary systematically with changes 
in government policies or the rules of the game.
6 Most 
of this research has been conducted by adherents of the 
so-called hypothesis of rational expectations. They 
model people as making decisions in dynamic settings 
in the face of well-defined constraints. Included among 
these constraints are laws of motion over time that 
describe such things as the taxes that people must pay 
and the prices of the goods that they buy and sell. The 
hypothesis of rational expectations is that people under-
stand these laws of motion. The aim of the research is 
to build models that can predict how people's behavior 
will change when they are confronted with well-under-
stood changes in ways of administering taxes, govern-
ment purchases, aspects of monetary policy, and the 
like. 
The Investment Decision as an Example 
A simple example will serve to illustrate both the 
principle that decision rules depend on the laws of 
motion that agents face and the extent that standard 
macroeconomic models have violated this principle. 
Let kt be the capital stock of an industry and rt be a tax 
rate on capital. Let zt be the first element of zt9 a vector 
of current and lagged variables including those that the 
government considers when it sets the tax rate on 
capital. We have rt = e
Tzt, where e is the unit vector 
with unity in the first place and zeros elsewhere.
7 Let a 





 a > 0 
(1) kt = \kt_x-aZ$EtTt+j 0 < X < 1 
J=0 0 < 8 < 1 
3Lucas and Sargent 1979 provides a brief explanation of econometric 
models and their uses in macroeconomics. 
4This evidence is cited by Litterman (1979) and his references. 
5Sims (1980) and Lucas (1976) describe why econometric models can 
perform well in extrapolating the future from the past, assuming no changes in 
rules of the game, while performing poorly in predicting the consequences of 
changes in the rules. 
6For an example of such research and extensive lists of further references, 
see Hansen and Sargent 1980 and Lucas and Sargent forthcoming. 
7Here T denotes matrix transposition. 
8The investment schedule (1) can be derived from the following dynamic 
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M )2} 
where/i,/2,/3, D > 0; 0 > P > 1; and Eq is the mathematical expectation 
operator conditioned on information known at time 0. The maximization is 
subject to (kt-1, zt) being known at the time /. Maximization problems of this 
kind are analyzed in Sargent 1979. The parameters X, a, and S can be shown to 
be functions of/i, /2, /3, and d. 
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where Etzt+j is the tax rate at time t which is expected 
to prevail at time (t+j). 
Equation (1) captures the notion that the demand 
for capital responds negatively to current and future 
tax rates. However, equation (1) does not become an 
operational investment schedule or decision rule until 
we specify how agents' views about the future, Etzt+J-, 
are formed. Let us suppose that the actual law of mo-
tion for zt is 
(2) zt+l=Azt 
where A is a matrix conformable with zt? If agents 
understand this law of motion for zt, the first element 
of which is zt, then their best forecast of rt+j is e
TA
Jzt. 
We impose rational expectations by equating agents' 
expectations Etrt+j to this best forecast. Upon impos-
ing rational expectations, some algebraic manipulation 
implies the operational investment schedule 
(3) kt =\kt_\ - ae
T(I-8A)~
xzt. 
In terms of the list of variables on the right-hand 
side, equation (3) resembles versions of investment 
schedules which were fit in the heyday of Keynesian 
macroeconomics in the 1960s. This is not unusual, for 
the innovation of rational expectations reasoning is 
much more in the ways equations are interpreted and 
manipulated to make statements about economic pol-
icy than in the look of the equations that are fit. Indeed, 
the similarity of standard and rational expectations 
equations suggests what can be shown to be true gen-
erally: that the rational expectations reconstruction of 
macroeconomics is not mainly directed at improving 
the statistical fits of Keynesian or monetarist macro-
economic models over given historical periods and that 
its success or failure cannot be judged by comparing 
the R
vs of reconstructed macroeconomic models with 
those of models constructed and interpreted along ear-
lier lines. 
Under the rational expectations assumption, the 
investment schedule (3) and the laws of motion for the 
tax rate and the variables that help predict it (2) have 
a common set of parameters, namely, those of the 
matrix A. These parameters appear in the investment 
schedule because they influence agents' expectations 
of how future tax rates will affect capital. Further, 
notice that all of the variables in zt appear in the 
investment schedule, since via equation (2) all of these 
variables help agents forecast future tax rates. (Com-
pare this with the common econometric practice of 
using only current and lagged values of the tax rate as 
proxies for expected future tax rates.) 
The fact that (2) and (3) share a common set of 
parameters (the A matrix) reflects the principle that 
firms' optimal decision rule for accumulating capital, 
described as a function of current and lagged state and 
information variables, will depend on the constraints 
(or laws of motion) that firms face. That is, the firm's 
pattern of investment behavior will respond system-
atically to the rules of the game for setting the tax rate 
rt. A widely understood change in the policy for 
administering the tax rate can be represented as a 
change in the first row of the A matrix. Any such 
change in the tax rate regime or policy will thus result 
in a change in the investment schedule (3). The de-
pendence of the coefficients of the investment sched-
ule on the environmental parameters in A is reasonable 
and readily explicable as a reflection of the principle 
that agents' rules of behavior change when they en-
counter changes in the environment in the form of new 
laws of motion for variables that constrain them. 
To illustrate this point, consider two specific tax 
rate policies. First consider the policy of a constant tax 
rate zt+j = zt for all j > 0. Then zt = r„ A = 1, and the 
investment schedule is 
(4) kt = \k(_j + h0zt where h0 = -a/(l-<5). 
Now consider an on-again, off-again tax rate policy of 
the form zt = -rM. In this case zt = zt, A = -1, and 
the investment schedule becomes 
(5) kt =\kt_x + h0zt where now 
/*o =-<*/( 1+5). 
Here the investment schedule itself changes as the 
policy for setting the tax rate changes. 
Standard econometric practice has not acknowl-
edged that this sort of thing happens. Returning to the 
more general investment example, the usual econo-
metric practice has been roughly as follows. First, a 
model is typically specified and estimated of the form 
9The eigenvalues of A are assumed to be less than <H in absolute value. 
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(6) kt = X kt-i + hzt 
where h is a vector of free parameters of dimension 
conformable with the vector zt. Second, holding the 
parameters h fixed, equation (6) is used to predict the 
implications of alternative paths for the tax rate rt. This 
procedure is equivalent to estimating equation (4) from 
historical data when rt = rt_x and then using this same 
equation to predict the consequences for capital ac-
cumulation of instituting an on-again, off-again tax rate 
policy of the form zt = -rM. Doing this assumes that a 
single investment schedule of the form (6) can be found 
with a single parameter vector h that will remain fixed 
regardless of the rules for administering the tax rate.
1
0 
The fact that equations (2) and (3) share a common 
set of parameters implies that the search for such a 
regime-independent decision schedule is misdirected 
and bound to fail. This theoretical presumption is 
backed up by the distressing variety of instances in 
which estimated econometric models have failed tests 
for stability of coefficients when new data are added. 
This problem cannot be overcome by adopting more 
sophisticated and more general lag distributions for the 
vector /z, as perhaps was hoped in the 1960s. 
General Implications 
The investment example illustrates the general pre-
sumption that the systematic behavior of private agents 
and the random behavior of market outcomes both will 
change whenever agents' constraints change, as when 
government policy or other parts of the environment 
change. To make reliable statements about policy 
interventions, we need dynamic models and econo-
metric procedures which are consistent with this gen-
eral presumption. Foremost, we need a new and stricter 
definition of the class of parameters that can be 
regarded as structural. The body of doctrine associ-
ated with the simultaneous equations model in econo-
metrics properly directs the attention of the researcher 
beyond reduced form parameters to the parameters of 
structural equations which are meant to describe those 
aspects of people's behavior that remain constant 
across a range of hypothetical environments. Although 
such structural parameters are needed to analyze an 
interesting class of policy interventions, most often 
included among them have been parameters of equa-
tions describing the rules of choice for private agents. 
Consumption functions, investment schedules, and de-
mand functions for assets are all examples of such 
rules of choice. In dynamic settings, regarding the 
parameters of these rules of choice as structural or 
invariant under policy interventions violates the princi-
ple that optimal decision rules depend on the environ-
ment in which agents believe they are operating. 
If parameters of decision rules cannot be regarded 
as structural or invariant under policy interventions, 
deeper objects that can must be sought. The best that 
can be hoped for is that parameters characterizing 
private agents' preferences and technologies will not 
change when changes in economic policy change the 
environment. If dynamic econometric models were 
formulated explicitly in terms of the parameters of 
preferences, technologies, and constraints, in principle 
they could be used to predict the effects on observed 
behavior of changes in policy rules. In terms of our 
investment example with equations (2) and (3), the 
idea would be to estimate the free parameters of the 
model (X, a, <5, A). With these estimates, economists 
could predict how the investment schedule would 




Policymakers must choose among alternative 
rules, not isolated actions 
These ideas have implications not only for theoretical 
and econometric practices, but also for the ways in 
which policymakers and their advisers think about the 
choices confronting them. In particular, the rational 
expectations approach directs attention away from 
particular isolated actions and toward choices among 
feasible rules of the game, or repeated strategies for 
choosing policy variables. While Keynesian and mon-
etarist macroeconomic models have been used to try to 
analyze what the effects of isolated actions would be, it 
is now clear that the answers they have given have 
necessarily been bad, if only because such questions 
are ill-posed. 
In terms of our investment example, by selecting 
different values for the first row of A, we can analyze 
the effects on current and subsequent investment of 
switching from one well-understood policy for setting 
10This is analogous to assuming that Houston's propensity to punt on fourth 




 As claimed in footnote 8, the parameters (A, a, 8) can be shown to be 
functions of the parameters C/1,/2,/3,^) of the present value function being 
maximized in (*). 
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the tax rate to another—that is, we can analyze the 
effects of different strategies for setting the tax rate. 
However, we cannot analyze the effects on current and 
subsequent investment of alternative actions consisting 
of different possible settings for the tax rate zt at a 
particular point in time t = 7. For in order to make 
predictions, we must specify agents' views about the 
law of motion A, and this is not done when we simply 
consider actions consisting of alternative settings for zt 
at one isolated point in time. This idea is so widely 
accepted as to be uncontroversial among decision 
theorists (and football fans); but even today practicing 
macroeconomists usually ignore it. 
To take a concrete example, in the United States 
there was recently interest in analyzing what would 
happen to the rate of domestic extraction of oil and gas 
if the tax on profits of oil producers increased a lot on a 
particular date. Would supply go up or down if the tax 
were raised to X percent on July 1 ? The only scientifi-
cally respectable answer to this question is "I don't 
know." Such a rise in the oil-profits tax rate could be 
interpreted as reflecting one of a variety of different tax 
strategies (A matrices), each with different implica-
tions for current and prospective extraction of oil. 
For example, suppose that oil companies had rea-
son to believe that the increase in the tax is temporary 
and will be repealed after the election. In that case, 
they would respond by decreasing their rate of supply 
now and increasing it later, thus reallocating their sales 
to periods in which their shareholders get a larger share 
of profits and the government a smaller share. Yet 
suppose that oil companies believed that the increase 
in the tax rate on July 1 is only the beginning and that 
further increases will follow. In that case, the response 
to the tax rate increase would be the reverse: to 
increase supply now and decrease it later in order to 
benefit companies' shareholders. This example illus-
trates that people's views about the government's 
strategy for setting the tax rate are decisive in deter-
mining their responses to any given actions and that the 
effects of actions cannot be reliably evaluated in iso-
lation from the policy rule or strategy of which they are 
an element. 
What policymakers (and econometricians) should 
recognize, then, is that societies face a meaningful set 
of choices about alternative economic policy regimes. 
For example, the proper question is not about the size 
of tax cut to impose now in response to a recession, but 
about the proper strategy for repeatedly adjusting tax 
rates in response to the state of the economy, year in 
and year out. Strategic questions of this nature abound 
in fiscal, monetary, regulatory, and labor market mat-
ters. Private agents face the problem of determining the 
government regime under which they are operating, 
and they often devote considerable resources to doing 
so. Whether governments realize it or not, they do 
make decisions about these regimes. They would be 
wise to face these decisions deliberately rather than 
ignore them and pretend to be able to make good 
decisions by taking one seemingly unrelated action 
after another. 
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